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Rio Grande Designs:
Texans' NAFTA Water Claim Against
Mexico
By
Paul Stanton Kibel* & Jonathan R. Schutz**
I.
INTRODUCTION:
AT THE CONFLUENCE OF COMMON RESOURCES AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
The Rio Grande River basin is 180,000 square miles, runs from Colorado to
the Gulf of Mexico, and forms more than 1,200 miles of the border between
Mexico and the United States of America.1 Although the headwaters of the Rio
Grande lie in Colorado, all of the major tributaries to the Rio Grande's border
section originate in Mexico. In contrast, all of the major tributaries to the
Colorado River - which flows south from the Rocky Mountains to the Sea of
Cortez (or Gulf of California) in Mexico - are in the United States.
Various treaties govern the relationship between the United States and
Mexico. In 1944, the United States and Mexico entered into a treaty to allocate
2the waters of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers ("1944 Rivers Treaty"). In
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1. Mary E. Kelly, Water Management in the Binational Texas/Mexico Rio Grande Rio Bravo
Basin, in HUMAN POPULATION AND FRESHWATER RESOURCES: U.S. CASES AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, YALE SCHOOL OF FORESTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BULLETIN 107, 116
(Karin M. Krchnak ed., 2002).
2. Norris Hundley, The Politics of Water and Geography: California and the Mexican-
American Treaty of 1944, 36 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW 209, 209 (1967) [hereinafter Politics of
- 228 -
2007] TEXANS' NAFTA WATER CLAIMAGAINST MEXICO 229
1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") approved by
Canada, Mexico and the United States went into effect. Chapter 11 of NAFTA
established a set of new protections for foreign investors in each of the three
signatory countries. While many bilateral investment treaties protect against
direct appropriation by the government, NAFTA's Chapter 11 investor
protection provisions went beyond the traditional direct appropriation language
to establish a new right for private foreign investors to claim compensation for
government acts that are "tantamount" to direct appropriation. 3 Although its
expansion of traditional notions of appropriation did not receive much attention
at the time of the NAFTA negotiations, Chapter 11 has become increasingly
controversial during the past decade of implementation. Private business
interests have used Chapter 11 to seek payment from foreign national
governments for the enforcement of policies and legislation designed to protect
public health and depleted natural resources, arguing that such policies and
legislation adversely affect the profitability of their investments and are
therefore tantamount to expropriation. This use of Chapter 11 has provoked
widespread criticism from environmental groups throughout North America.
A recent case has arisen at the legal and policy confluence of the historical
dispute over the bi-national allocation of Rio Grande waters and NAFTA's new
expansive investor protection provisions. In 2004, a group of landowners and a
water company from Texas' Rio Grande Valley in the United States
(collectively referred to herein as the "Texans") filed a notice of intent to submit
a claim against Mexico under NAFTA's Chapter 11. The thrust of the Texans'
claim is that Mexico failed to release the quantities of Rio Grande water
required under the 1944 Rivers Treaty and that Mexico therefore must reimburse
the Texans for economic damages resulting from this alleged improper
withholding. 4
Significantly, the 2004 filing of the Texans' NAFTA water claim against
Mexico came on the heels of the United States Court of Federal Claims' 2001
Tulare Lake decision in which the federal government was ordered to
compensate a group of farmers in California for economic damages suffered
when out-of-stream diversions for irrigation were reduced to preserve critical
aquatic habitats for fish species protected under the United States Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"). 5 The legal basis for this decision was a finding that the
government's in-stream flow requirements to protect endangered fisheries
Water]. The 1944 Rivers Treaty can be found at 59 U.S.C. § 1219 (1946) [hereinafter Treaty].
3. INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. and WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, PRIVATE RIGHTS,
PUBLIC PROBLEMS: A GUIDE TO NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR RIGHTS 7-8
(2001) [hereinafter Private Rights]; J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and
Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465, 471 (1999).
4. Request for Arbitration Under the Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the
Administration of Proceedings by the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes and
the North American Free Trade Agreement between Bayview Irrigation District et al, and The
United States of Mexico (Jan. 19, 2005).
5. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl.
2001).
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constituted a compensable "taking" under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 6 The attorneys that represented the California farmers in the
Tulare Lake ESA litigation now represent the Texans in their NAFTA Rio
Grande claim. As such, the scenario that now presents itself is in essence a test
case to see whether the water-related takings argument accepted in Tulare Lake
can be expanded and elevated to apply in the international context of the 1944
Rivers Treaty and NAFTA. A recent article on the Rio Grande Chapter 11 case
in High Country News-a news magazine on resource issues in the American
west-ran with the headline "Texas Water Case is Takings on Steroids,"7 With
good reason, environmental and trade communities in North America are
keeping a close watch on how this claim plays out.
Our article begins with an analysis of the historical context and key
provisions in the 1944 Rivers Treaty between Mexico and the United States.
Next, we explain the expropriation claims process established by NAFTA's
Chapter 11 and describe the environmental controversy that has arisen over its
implementation. We follow with an account of the Texans' NAFTA water claim
against Mexico, including an analysis of this claim's relation to the Tulare Lake
decision and parallel dispute resolution proceedings at the International and
Boundary Waters Commission.
At the end of this review, our finding is that the Texans' NAFTA water
claim against Mexico is not well-founded from either a legal or a public policy
standpoint. This finding is based on a close reading of the operative language in
the 1944 Rivers Treaty and NAFTA's Chapter 11; on differences between the
domestic law context of the Tulare Lake case and the public international law
context of the bi-national Rio Grande dispute; and finally, and on a subsequent
2005 judicial decision in the United States that greatly discredited the Tulare
Lake holding.8
II.
DIVVYING UP THE RiO GRANDE AND COLORADO: 1944 RIVERS TREATY
A. Historical Context for the 1944 Rivers Treaty
Although the mainstem of the Rio Grande River originates in the United
States, the river is mostly dry where it becomes the bi-national border until the
Rio Conchos enters the United States at Presidio, Texas. The Rio Conchos is the
largest Rio Grande tributary, contributing thirty-five to forty percent of the Rio
Grande's flows from the point of confluence. 9 All of the major tributaries to the
6. Id. at 319.
7. Paul Krza, Texas Water Case is 'Takings' on Steroids, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Feb. 21,
2005, at 1).
8. Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
9. TEX. CTR. FOR POLICY STUDIES, THE DISPUTE OVER SHARED WATER OF THE Rio
GRANDE/RIO BRAVO, A PRIMER 7 (2002) [hereinafter Primer]. The Rio Conchos basin makes up
about 14% of the Rio Grande Basin.
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Rio Grande's border section originate in Mexico.
Mexico-United States controversies over the waters of the Rio Grande
began as early as 1873 with the Chamizal dispute. This dispute was a boundary
conflict caused when the Rio Grande shifted and cut off 600 acres of Mexican
land, essentially placing these formerly Mexican lands within United States
territory. After several decades of diplomatic sparring, the matter was eventually
arbitrated by the International and Boundary Waters Commission ("IBWC").
The IBWC was established by Mexico and the United States in 1889 to provide
a forum to help resolve trans-border river disputes.' 0 In 1911, the IBWC
awarded about two-thirds of the land at issue to Mexico, but the United States
"refused to abide by the decision."'1 1 The dispute continued until 1963, when
President John F. Kennedy finally agreed to settle it according to the 1911
IBWC compromise proposal.
12
A subsequent dispute involving the Rio Grande's waters arose in 1888,
when low rainfall combined with upstream diversions to cause water shortages
in Texas and Mexico. 13 The affected Texan parties successfully lobbied
Congress to pass a joint resolution in 1890, requesting that then President
Benjamin Harrison negotiate a solution between Mexico and the United
States. 14 Mexico's position was that excessive diversions by American users
caused the shortages. 15 The conflict continued until 1894 when drought
exacerbated the problem and Mexico's Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the
United States Secretary of State with a claim for $35,000,000 in damages. 1
6
As early as 1896, the IBWC was involved in efforts to create a bi-national
water apportionment scheme for the Rio Grande. 17 With the IBWC's assistance,
a treaty between Mexico and the U.S. was signed in 1906 allocating 60,000
acre-feet ("af") of the Rio Grande to Mexico, and the remainder to the United
States. 18 The United States' position was that the 1906 treaty did not create
Mexican rights to Rio Grande water under international law and, instead, simply
reflected a gesture of friendship and equity. 19 Though not an official
acknowledgement of Mexico's existing water rights, the 60,000 af allocation in
10. 26 U.S.C. § 1512 (1889); Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2.
11. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR. DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 98 (1966) (hereafter DIVIDING THE WATERS).
12. THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE,
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/CC/nbe 1 .html; see also
http://austin.episd.org/ephistory/quadchamizall .htm and
http://www.epcc.edu/ftpfHomes/monicaw/borderlands/14_chamizal-dispute.htm.
13. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 21-22.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 22. Mexico's damages claim was the impetus for the Harmon opinion. See infra,
note 47.
17. Id. at 24.
18. Id. at 29-30. Essentially, the U.S. agreed to construct the Elephant Butte reservoir and
provide Mexico with 60,000 af annually from this reservoir. Id. at 29.
19. Id.at29,71.
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the 1906 treaty was based on Mexico's existing uses.20 The question of existing
uses would arise again in later treaty negotiations regarding the Rio Grande.
2 1
In the 1920s, the debates over a domestic Colorado River Compact among
American western states presented another potential opportunity to consider the
question of apportionment of trans-border river waters with Mexico. In 1928,
the United States Congress approved legislation that included federal ratification
of the Colorado River Compact, which had been previously signed by
representatives of seven states in 1922.22 The Compact allocated the total flow
of the Colorado River between the upper basin (consisting of the states of
Colorado, Wyoming, Utah and New Mexico) and lower basin (consisting of the
states of California, Nevada and Arizona), and left approximately 1.5 million af
("maf') of the estimated total 16.5 maf of annual Colorado River flow
unapportioned between the upper basin and lower basin, presumably to satisfy
Mexico's claims.23 Although this 1.5 maf of Colorado River water was left
unapportioned under the Compact, little effort was made by the United States at
the time to ground Mexico's rights to the Colorado or other trans-boundary
rivers (e.g., the Rio Grande) in treaty obligations. 24 Mexican concerns in this
regard were rebuffed.
25
In early 1941, Mexico again pressed for a clearer quantification of its rights
to shared rivers (e.g., the Colorado, Rio Grande, and Tijuana) and submitted a
draft of a comprehensive waters treaty to the United States.26 At this point in
time, the United States was more inclined to negotiate than it had been
previously, in part due to its Good Neighbor Policy.2 7 The Good Neighbor
Policy originated with United States President Franklin Roosevelt, who "took
office determined to improve relations with the nations of Central and South
America." 2 8 It emphasized "cooperation and trade rather than military force to
maintain stability in the hemisphere" 2 9 and "represented an attempt to distance
the United States from earlier interventionist policies .. ."30 The Policy also
came into play because the United States was firmly backing the United Nations
20. Politics of Water, supra note 2, at 214.
21. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 98.
22. The Compact can be found at 42 Stat. 171 (1921).
23. NORRIS HUNDLEY JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND
THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST 183, 185 (1975) [hereinafter WATER AND THE
WEST].
24. Id. at 176-77, 204.
25. Id. at 175, 204.
26. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 99.
27. Id. at 100.
28. U.S. Dep't of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17341.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2006). "In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, Roosevelt stated: 'In the field of world policy I
would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor-the neighbor who resolutely respects
himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others.' Roosevelt's Secretary of State,
Cordell Hull, participated in the Montevideo Conference of December 1933, where he backed a
declaration favored by most nations of the Western Hemisphere: 'No state has the right to intervene




2007] TEXANS' NAFTA WATER CLAIMAGAINST MEXICO 233
organizational conference taking place in San Francisco. Due to its support of
the United Nations conference, the United States "wanted the friendship and
cooperation of the Latin-American nations and was then removing outstanding
issues that would endanger its policy."3 1 The IBWC assisted Mexico and the
United States in the negotiations.
32
The Rio Grande portion of the treaty, described in detail below, was
quickly negotiated both because some of the issues had been resolved earlier in
1906, and because the United States stood to gain flood control rights and
hydroelectricity.
3 3
In contrast, the allocation of the Colorado proved the most contentious
aspect of the negotiations. In its initial draft, Mexico sought recognition of its
right to 3.5 maf of Colorado flow.34 The United States negotiators' initial
starting point was that the treaty should be based on Mexico's present uses
(which were less than 1.5 million af), while Mexico argued that additional
allocations were needed to provide for its anticipated future uses of Colorado
River water.3 5 Within the United States, the proposed treaty was opposed
principally by California. 36 California argued that 1.5 maf was far in excess of
Mexico's historical use and that Mexico should only be allocated the amount it
used prior to the construction of Hoover Dam, or about 700,000 af per year in
the early 1930s.
37
California's more aggressive position, however, was not ultimately
embraced by the United States negotiators, since the latter were confident it
would be rejected by Mexico. 38 In sharp contrast to the 3.5 maf Mexico initially
sought, the United States made a counter-offer to grant Mexico 900,000 af of
Colorado water plus $15,000,000. 3 9 Mexico then countered with an offer of two
maf.4 0 In response, the United States offered Mexico 1.25 maf, assuming that
Mexico would receive ufp to two maf because of return flow41 below the All-
American Canal intake. Mexico countered with 1.7 maf. The United States
31. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 159.
32. Id. at 131.
33. Id. at 131-32. Ironically, at the time of the Treaty, many felt that the Treaty was
negotiated for the benefit of Texas. Politics of Water, supra note 2, at 211. By sending 1.5 maf/year
to Mexico from the Colorado, more water could be sent from Mexico down the Rio Grande. Id. at
212. Some went as far as to say that "California was sacrificed on the altar of Texas and the Good
Neighbor policy." Id..
34. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 102.
35. Id. at 102-03.
36. Politics of Water, supra note 2, at 209. California was concerned that any amount of
surplus Colorado River water that went to Mexico would diminish its entitlement. DIVIDING THE
WATERS, supra note 11, at 105.
37. Politics of Water, supra note 2, at 210, 213-14; WATER AND THE WEST, supra note 23,
at 296.
38. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 108, 110, 126.
39. Id. at 102.
40. Id. at 103.
41. Return flow refers to water that returns to its source supply after being diverted away and
used.
42. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 132. As its name suggests, the All American
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then offered 8 percent of lower basin diversions plus 750,000 af.4 3 Finally the
United States made a flat offer of 1.5 maf.44 Except for California, all of the
Colorado basin states approved of the State Department's offer.
45
This offer was incorporated into the final text of the 1944 Rivers Treaty,
which was next sent to the United States Senate for ratification. Senators from
Nevada joined those from California in opposing the agreement.46 California
cited the 1895 opinion issued by then United States Attorney General Judson
Harmon in which Harmon argued that the United States, as the upper riparian
nation, was not accountable to Mexico, the lower riparian nation, and was
entitled to exercise "total sovereignty" over all of the upper basin river resources
in its territory. Those states favoring the 1944 Rivers Treaty pointed to
numerous international water allocation treaties that contained provisions
contradicting Harmon's opinion.47 In the end, California's efforts to block the
agreement were unsuccessful and the United States Senate approved the 1944
Rivers Treaty by a vote of seventy-six to ten.
48
Most of the Mexican professionals and Foreign Affairs Department
representatives attending the Mexican Senate's hearing on the Treaty found the
treaty reasonably favorable to Mexico's interests.4 9 The agreement quantified
Mexico's right to an amount of Colorado River water that seemed sufficient for
Mexico's present urposes - an improvement over the previous lack of any
quantified rights. However, worries remained regarding the absence of
specific provisions ensuring the quality of water provided to Mexico. 5 1 These
worries would later prove warranted when much of the Colorado water sent by
the United States to Mexico contained such elevated saline levels that the water
was unusable for irrigation or drinking. 52 Despite these unresolved water quality
concerns, Mexico's Senate voted unanimously to ratify the 1944 Rivers
Treaty. 53 Historian Evan Ward observed that, "[M]exican politicians knew that
if they pressed for a standard of water quality, then the quantity would surely be
reduced. Put another way, those with the most to lose economically and
politically insisted on letting the next generation grapple with issues related to
Canal ("AAC") was constructed to be located entirely in the U.S., replacing the Alamo Canal, which
ran through both the U.S. and Mexico. The AAC was authorized in 1928 and completed in 1942.
The AAC delivers Colorado River water to California's Imperial Valley.
43. Id. at 133.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 134.
46. Id. at 139.
47. Id. at 146. The Harmon opinion was written by Attorney General Judson Harmon in
1895. It stated that the U.S. had total sovereignty over the resources within its borders. WATER AND
THE WEST, supra note 23, at 81.
48. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 163.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 166.
51. Id. at 168.
52. EVAN R. WARD, BORDER OASIS: WATER AND THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF THE
COLORADO RIVER DELTA, 1940-1975,67 (2003).
53. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 169.
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water quality."
54
B. The Colorado Salinity Crisis and its Aftertaste
While the Colorado salinity crisis did not directly concern the Rio Grande,
an understanding of the crisis and its legacy is required to appreciate the broader
historical context of Mexico-United States water conflicts and the Texans'
current damages claim against Mexico under NAFTA's Chapter 11. The United
States has generally complied with the obligations set forth in the 1944 Rivers
Treaty to deliver specified quantities of Colorado River flow to Mexico. It is not
so clear, however, whether the quality of the Colorado River water delivered to
Mexico complies with the Treaty's requirements.
Significantly, the 1944 Rivers Treaty does not contain provisions expressly
mandating certain water quality levels either for Rio Grande water delivered by
Mexico to the United States, or for Colorado River water delivered by the
United States to Mexico. Mexico initially suggested the inclusion of such water
quality provisions in the agreement but the United States succeeded in keeping
them out.5 5 As Marc Reisner observed: "By treaty we had promised them a
million and a half acre-feet of water. But we hadn't promised them usable
water."56 According to water historian Norris Hundley Jr., a common American
response to these water quality concerns was to argue that Mexico could not
complain about the quality of water it received because it had been granted more
water under the 1944 Rivers Treaty than it deserved. 57
Mexico, of course, had a much different view of the water quality issue.
The discussions leading up to the 1944 Rivers Treaty recognized Mexico's past,
present and anticipated future use of Colorado River water for irrigation and
domestic drinking water supply, and the treaty itself noted that water was
needed by Mexico for domestic, agricultural, and livestock use.58 Therefore,
Mexico's position was that if poor quality rendered the water provided by the
United States unfit for these purposes, then deliveries of such water were
inconsistent with the assumptions and terms of the 1944 Rivers Treaty.
59
Colorado River water quality emerged as a major bi-national issue in the
early 1960s when Lake Powell began filling behind Glen Canyon Dam in Utah.
The filling caused less water than normal to be released, thereby reducing the
Colorado River flow downstream of the new impoundment. 6° In addition to the
decreased water flow, the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District in
54. WARD, supra note 52, at 91.
55. DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 157.
56. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 7 (1993); see also DIVIDING THE WATERS, supra note 11, at 155, 157.
57. Politics of Water, supra note 2, at 212-213; WATER AND THE WEST, supra note 23, at
316.
58. WARD, supra note 52, at 67, 103-04.
59. Id.
60. David H. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 COLO.L.REV 413,
462 (1985).
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Arizona began discharging saline wastewater into the Colorado River.6 1 Salinity
levels in the lower Colorado River soared, which caused dire conditions in the
agricultural lands in Mexico along the lower Colorado River.62 The drinking
water supply in many Baja communities in Mexico was also threatened by the
Colorado River's rising salt concentrations. 63 One 1961 study, for example,
revealed that the City of Mexicali's salinity level was 2,500 parts per million
("ppm") - greatly exceeding the 1,500 ppm salinity limit used at the time by the
World Health Organization to determine potability.
64
In May 1964, about four hundred Mexican farmers protested outside the
United States Consulate in Mexicali. 65 They trailed a coffin filled with salt, and
held signs reading "Salt us first - talk to us later." 66 They also hung a large
banner from a building across the street from the consulate that read "Enough
Salinity Already."
67
The salt protests eventually led the IBWC to work with the United States
and Mexico on a possible solution. The interim result was the 1965 issuance of
Minute 218 in which the United States agreed to construct a drainage channel
from Wellton-Mohawk to Morelos Dam to reduce saline discharges into the
Colorado River.68 However, pursuant to Minute 218, Mexico was still charged
for waters delivered, regardless of their salinity levels, as set forth under the
quantitative arrangements of the 1944 Rivers Treaty.6 9 As such, Minute 218 was
not well-received among Mexicali Valley farmers and, moreover, the Wellton-
Mohawk drainage channel had only a modest impact on improving salinity
levels.
70
In 1971, Mexican President Luis Echeverria responded to American
intransigence by threatening to sue the United States in the International Court
of Justice ("ICJ") for violations of the 1944 Rivers Treaty.7 1 Historian Norris
Hundley Jr. opined at the time, "It is almost assured that no Tribunal of
Arbitration will support the United States so long as it looks to fulfill the treaty
by giving Mexico unusable water." 72 Similarly, legal scholars at the
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico's Center for International Relations
concluded that Mexico was almost certain to prevail if the matter was brought
before the ICJ.
7 3
In a speech to the United States Congress in 1972, Mexican President Luis
61. Id.
62. Ward, supra note 52, at 67.
63. Id. at 67.
64. Id. at 73.
65. Id. at 84.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 59.
69. Id. at 85.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 108.
72. Id. at 104.
73. Id. at 109.
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Echeverria contrasted the United States' lack of commitment to resolving the
Colorado salinity crisis with the resources being committed to the ongoing war
in Vietnam. 74 Echeverria asked "why the United States does not use the same
boldness and imagination that it applies to solving complex problems with its
enemies to the solution of simple problems with its friends." 75 According to
historian Evan Ward, by giving such speeches, "Echeveria successfully
transformed a regional issue into an international platform for Mexican
nationalism."
7 6
The prospect of ICJ litigation, as well as the increasingly unpleasant
international profile of the crisis, eventually persuaded the United States to enter
into a more comprehensive salinity-control resolution with Mexico in August
1973.77 The commitments of the United States under the August 1973
agreement were codified with the passage of the Colorado River Salinity
Control Act in 1974.78
Mexico's experience with the Colorado salinity issue has colored trans-
border water resource relations with the United States concerning
implementation of the 1944 Rivers Treaty. From the Mexican perspective, the
United States violated the agreement with impunity for decades and was only
persuaded to stop under the threat of international litigation and when
confronted with broad international pressure. Moreover, the United States never
assumed responsibility for the economic damages to farmers in Baja California
caused by this alleged longstanding noncompliance.
C. The 1944 Rivers Treaty Apportionment Regime
More than sixty years after its adoption, the 1944 Rivers Treaty remains the
primary document governing the respective rights of United States and Mexico
to the international river courses shared by the two nations.
7 9
The agreement allocates to the United States one-third of the flow reaching
the Rio Grande from the Rio Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and
Saldado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo.80 This one-third is not to be less than
350,000 acre-feet (af) annually averaged over a five-year period. 8 1 The five-year
cycle is considered terminated, all debts are deemed to be paid in full, and a new
five-year cycle begins "[w]henever the conservation capacities assigned to the
United States in at least two of the major international reservoirs, including the
74. Id.
75. Id. at 60-61.
76. Id. at 61.
77. Id. at 116, 118-19.
78. Id. at 117-19.
79. Memorandum in Support of United States' Motion to Dismiss Counts 1-4 & 7-8,
Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, AC v. United States, 20 (D. Nev. September 19,
2005)(NO. CV-S-05-0870-KJD-GWF) [hereinafter U.S. Attorney Brie].
80. Treaty, supra note 2, at 1226-27.
81. Id.
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highest major reservoir, are filled with water belonging to the United States." 82
The 1944 Rivers Treaty provides an exception to Mexico's prescribed
obligations to deliver Rio Grande water. Specifically, the agreement states that
in times of "extraordinary drought," which make "it difficult for Mexico to
make available the run-off of 350,000 acre-feet annually[,] ... any deficiencies
existing at the end of the... five-year cycle shall be made up in the following
five year cycle . .."83 The 1944 Rivers Treaty, however, does not define the
circumstances that constitute "extraordinary drought" or what would make it
"difficult" for Mexico to deliver the specified quantities of water.
84
In terms of dispute resolution, the 1944 Treaty created a set of procedures
that reflected the view that disagreements concerning compliance with the
agreement should be resolved primarily, and if possible, through diplomatic
channels. 8 5 Specifically, Article 2 of the Treaty states:
The application of the present Treaty, the regulation and exercise of the rights and
obligations which the two Governments assume thereunder, and the settlement of
all disputes to which its observance and execution may give rise are hereby
entrusted to the International Boundary and Water Commission, which shall
function in conformity with the powers and limitations set forth in this Treaty...
Wherever there are provisions in this Treaty for joint action or joint agreement by
the two Governments ... it shall be understood that the particular matter in
question shall be handled by or though the Department of State of the United
States and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Mexico. 86
Article 2 of the 1944 Rivers Treaty establishes the IBWC as the
international forum for determining the rights and obligations of each party
under the agreement. 8 7 Specifically, the 1944 Rivers Treaty provides the IBWC
with the power and duty:
To settle all differences that may arise between the two Governments with respect
to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, subject to the approval of the
two Governments. In any case in which the Commissioners do not reach an
agreement, they shall so inform their respective governments reporting their
respective opinions and the grounds therefor and the points upon which they
differ, for discussion and adjustment of the difference through diplomatic
channels and for application where proper of the general or special agreements
which the two Governments have concluded for the settlement of controversies.88
The 1944 Rivers Treaty grants the IBWC the authority to resolve disputes
over water diversions from the Rio Grande River. Article 9 of the 1944 Rivers
Treaty states:
(d) The Commission shall have the power to authorize either country to divert
82. Id. at 1227-28.
83. Id. at 1227. There are similar provisions for when the U.S. is unable to deliver water
from the Colorado River to Mexico. Id. at Art. 10.
84. Primer, supra note 9, at 5.
85. U.S. Attorney Brief, supra note 79, at 18.
86. Treaty, supra note 2, at 1223.
87. Id. at 1222-25; see also U.S. Attorney Brief supra note 78, at 12, 13, 20.
88. Treaty, supra note 2, at 1256.
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and use water not belonging entirely to such country, when the water belonging to
the other country can be diverted and used without injury to the other and can be
replaced at some point on the river.
(e) The Commission shall have the power to authorize temporary diversion and
use by one country of water belonging to the other, when the latter does not need
it or is unable to use it, provided that such authorization or the use of such water
shall not establish any right to continue to divert it.
(f) In case of the occurrence of an extraordinary drought, in one country with an
abundant supply of water in the other country, water stored in the international
storage reservoirs and belonging to the country enjoying such abundant water
supply may be withdrawn, with the consent of the Commission, for the use of the
country undergoing the drought.89
D. Operation of the Rio Grade Apportionment Regime
Prior to the recent NAFTA claim by the Texans, the United States
Department of State and Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not private
actors with affected economic interests, enforced compliance with the terms of
the 1944 Rivers Treaty through government-to-government consultations.
90
Until the 1992 to 1997 five-year cycle, Mexico and the United States
experienced relatively few disputes regarding compliance with the Rio Grande
apportionment and delivery provisions of the 1944 Rivers Treaty. In fact, during
the pre-1992 period Mexico often delivered water in excess of its obligations.
While the initial five-year cycle ended in 195891 with a Mexican deficit of
476,461 af,92 Mexico's delivery in the next five-year cycle was "was more than
sufficient enough to cover the water delivery deficit" from the previous five-
year period. 93 Similarly, in the third five-year period Mexico delivered 32,270
af in excess of the five-year obligation of 1,750,000 af.94 From 1968 to 1992,
Mexico did not incur a deficit in any five-year period.9 5 As of 1992, therefore,
Mexico's delivery obligations were considered paid in full and a new five-year
cycle began. 96 Therefore, from 1953 to 1992, Mexico met its delivery
obligations in all but one five-year cycle, which occurred in the early 1950s
during a severe drought.
9 7
89. Id. at 1234-35.
90. U.S. Attorney Brief supra note 78, at 15-17.
91. IBWC, Minute 234, 1 (Dec. 2, 1969); IBWC, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES SECTION
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION: DELIVERIES OF WATERS ALLOTTED TO THE
UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE UNITED STATES - MEXICO WATER TREATY OF 1944 2
(April 2002) [hereinafter Deliveries of Water Allotted].
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 2-3.
94. Id. at 3.
95. IBWC, UPDATE OF THE HYDROLOGIC, CLIMATOLOGIC, STORAGE AND RUNOFF DATA
FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE MEXICAN PORTION OF THE RIO GRANDE BASIN: OCTOBER 1992-
SEPTEMBER 2001 2-3 (April 2002) [hereinafter IBWC Update].v
96. Id. at 2.
97. LAURA BROCK, MARY E. KELLY & KAREN CHAPMAN, TEX. CTR. FOR POLICY
STUDIES, LEGAL & INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESTORING INSTREAM FLOWS IN THE RIO
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W
For the 1992 to 1997 and 1997 to 2002 five-year cycle periods, however,
Mexico claimed that drought conditions prevented it from delivering the
amounts of Rio Grande water specified in the 1944 Rivers Treaty. 9 8 There is
conflicting evidence as to whether Mexico's reduced delivery of Rio Grande
water was due entirely to hydrological drought considerations, or whether such
reductions were also due in part to increasing demands for Rio Grande water by
farmers and cities in Baja's Mexicali Valley. An IBWC report concluded that
rainfall in the Rio Grande tributaries during the 1993 to 1999 period was not
"appreciably below normal," despite a finding that "below-average rainfall
conditions occurred in each of the tributary watersheds during several of the
years since 1993."99 The same report also stated that rainfall in the Rio Conchos
Basin, the major Rio Grande tributary, was about fifty-five percent of normal in
1994 and about seventy percent of normal in 1995, while relatively normal in
1993, 1996, and 1997 .1U0 Another IBWC report states that in 1999, the Rio
Conchos Basin and Saldado Basin reservoirs were at twenty-six percent and
eleven percent of storage capacity, respectively.1 0 1 The average rainfall for the
Rio Conchos Basin between 1995 and 1999 was the lowest it had been since the
late 1940s and early 1950s. 102 Crop losses in Mexico in 1995 to 1996 were
estimated at 600,000 acres of sorghum, com, bean, and wheat, while Texas
citrus sugar cane and vegetable growers in the lower Rio Grande region also
suffered crop loss. 103 Given these accounts, it is difficult to ascertain precisely
whether hydrological conditions prevented Mexico from meeting its delivery
obligations.
Mexico also asserted that sedimentation in the storage reservoirs had
reduced storage capacity and thus prevented it from potentially releasing water
to fulfill its obligations.104 This reduced storage capacity affected how quickly
Mexico could practically "pay back" the water debt it had begun accumulating.
The 1944 Rivers Treaty does not offer a clear timeframe for when an
accumulated water debt needs to be paid back, nor does it indicate whether
Mexico is entitled to hold enough water in its reservoirs to meet its own water
GRANDE: FORT QUITMAN TO AMISTAD 24 (March 2001) [hereinafter Legal and Institutional
Framework]; Kelly, supra note 1, at 139; MARY E. KELLY, TEX. CTR. FOR POLICY STUDIES,
THE RiO CONCHOS: A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW 24 (2001), available at
http://www.texascenter.org/publications/rioconchos.pdf [hereinafter The Rio Conchos].
98. Krza, supra note 7; MARY E. KELLY & KAREN CHAPMAN, TEX. CTR. FOR POLICY
STUDIES, SHARING THE WATERS: U.S. AND MEXICO MUST COOPERATE 1 (May 2002) (stating that
it was not practical for Mexico to "rapidly" repay its deficit to the U.S.); Primer, supra note 9, at 8,
13.
99. IBWC Update, supra note 95, at 7.
100. Id. at Figure 11.
101. Deliveries of Waters Allotted, supra note 91, at 4.
102. Kelly, supra note 1, at 126, Figure 4, 139; The Rio Conchos, supra note 97, at Figure 5,
25. "For example, the average annual amount of water entering the La Boquilla reservoir in the
period 1935-1992 was . .. 1.043MAF; during the drought period of 1993 to 1999, it was...
0.699MAF. Id. at 8.
103. Kelly, supra note 1, at 125.
104. Legal & Institutional Framework, supra note 97, at 24.
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demands in times of drought. It also does not specify whether, under drought
conditions, Mexico has the right to delay a "pay back" as long as it delivers the
required amounts at some point within a subsequent five-year cycle.
The 1992 to 1997 cycle ended with a deficit of 1,023,849 af. 10 5 Relying on
the drought provisions of the 1944 Rivers Treaty, Mexico carried this debt over
to be repaid in the 1997-2002 cycle. At the end of the 1997-2002 cycle, once
again in reliance on the agreement's drought provisions, Mexico's cumulative
deficit had grown to 1.3 million af.
106
Mexico's invocation of its drought rights in the 1992 to 1997 and 1997 to
2002 cycles led to consultations between Mexico and the United States at the
IBWC to resolve how and when Mexico would pay back the water debt that it
had accumulated. IBWC proceedings then led to high-level discussions between
the federal Mexican and United States governments. In 2003, Mexico and the
United States reached an understanding wherein Mexico agreed to deliver
400,000 af - 50,000 more than required in non-drought years under the 1944
Rivers Treaty - by the end of the cycle year ending in October 2004. The 2003
agreement made significant progress on the water debt, and by October 2004
Mexico had reduced its deficit to 716,670 af for Rio Grande deliveries to the
United States.
107
With the IBWC's assistance, Mexico and the United States continued to
work towards a more complete and permanent resolution. On March 10, 2005,
the IBWC issued a press release announcing that such a resolution had been
reached. 10 8 The IBWC press release was entitled USIBWC Commissioner
Announces Resolution of Mexico's Rio Grande Water Debt and explained:
Commissioner Arturo Q. Duran of the United States Section of the International
Boundary and Water Commission (USIBWC) welcomed the announcement made
by Secretary of State Rice in Mexico City today that the United States and
Mexico have reached an understanding that will effectively eliminate Mexico's
Rio Grande water debt by the end of this water year (September 30, 2005).
Resolution of the water debt has been a top priority for President George W. Bush
due to the impacts on the Lower Rio Grande communities in Texas and the
ramifications for compliance with the 1944 Water Treaty...
The understanding, based on the recommendation of Duran and his counterpart,
Commissioner Arturo Herrera Solis of the Mexican Section of the Commission,
105. IBWC Update, supra note 95, at 3.
106. OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, WATER DEBT, FACT SHEET
(March 10, 2005)[hereinafter Water Debt].
107. Press Release, USIBWC, USIBWC Commissioners Announces Resolution of Mexico's
Rio Grande Water Debt (March 10, 2005) [hereinafter USIWBC Press Release], available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/PAO/CURPRESS/2005WaterDelFinalWeb.pdf. This progress, however,
did not satisfy some of the stakeholders in Texas, including Texas Agricultural Commissioner Susan
Combs. Combs urged the federal U.S. government to halt Colorado River water deliveries and all
other foreign aid to Mexico until full restitution was made. Clint Shields, H2owe: South Texas Area
Thirsty for Water from Mexico, FISCAL NOTES, October 2003, available at
http://www.riograndewaterplan.org/H2owe.php. Combs declared: "It is time to look at reprisals, and
I believe that all options should be on the table." Id.
108. US1WBC Press Release, supra note 107.
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provides for water transfers as well as additional deliveries in order to pay off the
entire debt...
Based on implementation of the understandings reached, the United States and
Mexico will consider that Mexico's water debt is completely eliminated. 109
On March 10, 2005, at the Mexico City meeting where the resolution was
reached, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked: "I am
pleased that we have reached a mutual understanding on the transfer of a sum of
water that will cover Mexico's debt to the United States under our 1944 Water
Treaty, thus ensuring continued cooperation in the management of precious
natural resources to the mutual benefit of both economies."I10
The IBWC-brokered resolution between Mexico and the United States was
silent, however, in terms of whether or how the resolution might affect the
Texans' pending NAFTA water claim against Mexico.
III.
NAFTA's CHAPTER 11:
EXPANSIVE PROTECTIONS FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTORS
Many bilateral investment treaties protect foreign investors against direct
appropriation by host countries. The provisions of NAFTA's Chapter 11,
however, significantly expanded the traditional investor protections against
appropriation in existing bilateral investment agreements. 
1 11
In recent years, a considerable body of scholarly legal work has been
undertaken to track the implementation and operation of NAFTA's Chapter 11.
This article will not attempt to duplicate or comprehensively analyze these
works but, rather, will point to the controversial nature of Chapter 11. Generally,
critics of Chapter 11 take issue with its broad definitions of investment and
appropriation, its dispute resolution mechanisms, and its impact on domestic
regulation.
At the outset, it is important to draw a distinction between the basis for the
environmental critiques of NAFTA Chapter 11 specifically and the basis for
environmental critiques of trade liberalization in general. They are not one and
the same, despite the fact that some of the same groups and stakeholders that
have criticized NAFTA Chapter 11 have also raised questions about the
environmental impacts of the broader international trade liberalization agenda.
As John Echeverria, Executive Director of the Georgetown Environmental Law
& Policy Institute, wrote in a 2003 article in THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM:
The significance of Chapter 11 has been difficult for the public and
environmental policy experts alike to grasp - in large part because it is one
109. Id.
110. Water Debt, supra 105.
111. Public Citizen, NAFTA 's Threat to Sovereignty and Democracy: The Record of NAFTA
Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases 1994-2005, 1-3 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter NAFTA 's Threat]; Private
Rights, supra note 3, at 7-8.
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component of a larger agreement focused on trade. Not surprisingly, criticism of
NAFTA Chapter II has been confused with opposition to free trade policies
(such as reductions in tariffs), with supporters of Chapter 11 characterizing
criticism of Chapter 11 as an anti-free trade position. In fact, some environmental
groups criticize both free trade policies and the investor-state litigation process. In
terms of substantive law and policy, however, the debate over the merits of
Chapter 11 is entirely distinct from the debate over the merits of reducing barriers
to trade in goods and services. One can be a free trader, and still be very
concerned about Chapter 11.112
The distinction noted by Echeverria explains why politicians in the United
States who are generally pro-NAFTA and pro-trade liberalization have sought to
restrict the scope of NAFTA Chapter 11. As Lori Wallach, an attorney with
Public Citizen, observed, an amendment put forth in 2004 by United States
Senator John Kerry reflected an effort to limit NAFTA's investor-to-state claim
process:
Right now, in the context of the fast-track authority debate in Congress, there is a
group of pro-NAFTA, pro-free trade, and pro-fast-track senators and
congressmen who are in favor of a fundamental pruning of the investor-to-state
substantive and procedural rights, to address what they see as major flaws with
the existing rules. Ironically, if you would ask Senator Kerry, he would say that
he sees this as saving NAFTA from itself.
[Senator Kerry] sees the issue as kind of a metastasizing tumor in NAFTA; that if
he does not put some boundaries on it, it is going to take down the whole notion
of trade... 113
In highlighting the distinction between more focused environmental
concerns about NAFTA Chapter 11 and broader environmental concerns about
trade liberalization, we are not suggesting that the latter concerns do not merit
serious consideration. Rather, we note the distinction here to emphasize that the
debate over the particular merits and performance of NAFTA Chapter 11 has at
times been distorted and misunderstood because of its relation to the larger
environmental debate over trade liberalization.
A. Chapter 11 's Definition of Investment
NAFTA's Chapter 11 protects investors from each NAFTA signatory
country, and investments from the economic effects of certain government
measures. Because Chapter Il 's protections only apply to investors, its
definition of "investment" is pivotal. Under NAFTA, "investment" means:
(a) an enterprise; (b) an equity security of an enterprise; (c) a debt security of an
enterprise (i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii) where the
112. John D. Echeverria, The Real Contract on America, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM,
July/Aug. 2003, at 28, 31.
113. Roundtable Discussion on Domestic Challenges if Multilateral Investment Treaties are
Interpreted to Expand the Compensation Requirements for Regulatory Expropriations Beyond a
Signatory State's Domestic Law, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 208, 246 (2002) [hereinafter Roundtable
Discussion]-
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original maturity of the debt security is at least three years, but does not include a
debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state enterprise; (d) a loan to an
enterprise (i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii) where the
original maturity of the loan is at least three years, but does not include a loan,
regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise; (e) an interest in an enterprise
that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of the enterprise; (f) an
interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that
enterprise on dissolution, other than a debt security or a loan excluded from
subparagraph (c) or (d); (g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible,
acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other
business purposes; and (h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or
other resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory,
such as under (i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the
territory of the Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions,
or (ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production,
revenues or profits of an enterprise. 114
NAFTA also clarifies that the following categories of economic interest do
not qualify as an investment for the purposes of Chapter I I's protection:
(i) claims to money that arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of
goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an
enterprise in the territory of another Party, or (ii) the extension of credit in
connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing, other than a
loan covered by subparagraph (d); or (j) any other claims to money, that do not
involve the kinds of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (h)... "115
Notwithstanding NAFTA Chapter 1 's list of those interests that do not
qualify as an "investment," the chapter has been criticized for its ambiguous and
potentially broad definition. 116 For instance, without further guidance, it is
unclear what types of economic activities/relationships are covered (or not
covered) by "an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in
income or profits of the enterprise," property "acquired in the expectation or
used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purposes," or
"interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the
territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory." An expansive reading
of this language could potentially cover almost any economic undertaking where
a private investor has the reasonable expectation of earning profits. 
1 17
B. Measures Deemed Tantamount to Expropriation Under NAFTA
Article 1110 of NAFTA _prohibits a Party from directly or indirectly
nationalizing or expropriating 1 "8 an investment of an investor of another Party
114. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex, art. 1139, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
115. Id.
116. Echeverria, supra note 112, at 35.
117. Id. at 33 (stating "[Chapter 11] authorizes investors to challenge virtually any kind of
government action, at any level, that impinges on the profitability of investments").
118. "NAFTA provides little guidance concerning the meaning of 'expropriation' or
'nationalization.' Neither term is defined in the agreement." Kevin Banks, NAFTA 's Article 1110 -
Can Regulation be Expropriation, 5 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 499, 510 (1999); see also
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in its territory or tak[ing] a measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation of such investment (expropriation), except: (a) for a public
purpose; (b) on a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of
law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation in accordance
with paragraphs two through six." 19 Where an expropriation does occur,
compensation is determined by the fair market value of the investment. 
12 0
Much of the criticism of Article 1110 has focused on the uncertainties as to
the scope and meaning of the phrase "tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation." The use of the term "tantamount" in this context suggests that
compensation may be required for government acts other than nationalization
and expropriation of assets, but Article 110 does not indicate what these other
acts might entail. For example, what if a member state adopts a new regulation
prohibiting the sale of a previously permitted product due to new information
about public health risks? Or, what if a member state adopts a new regulation
prohibiting the export of a natural resource due to domestic supply concerns?
Such regulatory actions could conceivably give rise to claims by adversely
affected foreign investors on the grounds that such measures are "tantamount" to
nationalization or expropriation.
C. Chapter 11 's Treatment of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
The absence of provisions in NAFTA Chapter 11 that ensure adequate
mechanisms for public access and public participation has been widely
criticized. 12 1 To settle disputes, Chapter 11 allows a private investor to initiate
arbitration directly against a Party. This investor-to-state dispute resolution is
contrasted by the state-to-state model set forth in the 1944 Rivers Treaty. The
party submitting the claim to arbitration may select from three sets of rules to
Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Carlos Calvo, Honorary
NAFTA Citizen, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 19, 28-29 (2002) (stating that an abstract definition
distinguishing between regulatory acts that are permissible from those that amount to expropriation
"is probably unworkable" and that there is "no single view on the matter"); Ethan Shenkman, Could
Principles of Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence be Helpful in Analyzing Regulatory
Expropriation Claims Under International Law, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 174, 177 (2002) (stating
that some tribunals have looked to customary international law to give meaning to the term
"expropriation"); Wagner, supra note 3, at 517 (stating that NAFTA does not define "measures
tantamount to... expropriation").
119. NAFTA, supra note 113, art. 1110 (emphasis added). Although some view the
reference to "tantamount" as expanding the concept of expropriation for NAFTA claims, Banks
points out that "a measure tantamount to an expropriation is one that is effectively or functionally
equivalent to an expropriation." Banks, supra note 117, at 513; see also Shenkman, supra note 117,
at 177-78 and Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.
64, 86.
120. NAFTA, supra note 113, art. 1110(2).
121. Echeverria, supra note 111, at 28, 37 (stating "The Chapter 11 litigation process
accords third parties none of the intervention fights, either by fight or as a matter of court discretion,
that exist under U.S. court rules. Given the frequency with which government policies relating to
environmental issues affect the interests of third parties, and the frequency with which government
officials fail to defend third-party interests in environmental cases, intervention rights have proven
vital to the enforcement of environmental standards.").
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govern the arbitration: (a) the ICSID Convention, 12 2 (b) the Additional Facility
Rules of the ICSID,123 or (c) the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.124 The results
of Chapter 11 arbitration proceedings are binding on the parties and no
procedure for appeal or review is specifically provided. 12 5 Additionally,
Chapter 11 does not expressly provide for public access or public participation
in arbitration proceedings, and the findings of the tribunal are only made public
if both parties agree. 
12 6
The Chapter 11 arbitration process is further criticized for how the
arbitration panels are comprised. Panelists on NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration
panels are normally selected from a roster comprised of professionals who have
expertise in international trade law; they are selected based on their "objectivity,
reliability and sound judgment." 127 However, "no particular qualifications [are]
specified for a tribunal member." 12 8 Each party chooses one arbitrator, who by
definition is not an independent judge insulated from political pressures, and a
third is agreed upon by both parties. 129 However, the role and responsibilities of
the arbitrators are uncertain. As Meg Kinear, General Counsel and Director of
the Trade Law Bureau for Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, noted during a 2004 symposium on multilateral investment
agreements held at New York University School of Law:
[I]s a party-appointed arbitrator meant to be an aggressive advocate of the
position of that party? Or are they meant to be at the opposite end of the spectrum
- a neutral judge-like character, who simply applies the facts to the law in a
neutral way once appointed? Are they something in between? Do they have a
responsibility for getting out the position of the party who appointed them, and
yet in deciding in a fair and neutral way? There's no guidance in NAFTA about
what their role is. 130
Another criticism of Chapter 11 's investor-to-state claim procedure is that
it does not provide for the diplomatic balancing of international issues found in
state-to-state dispute resolution regimes. 13 1 Kinear further observed:
In the state-to-state situation there are two states, with a whole panoply of
interests between them, political and economic. All of that is relevant to how they
122. ICSID refers to "the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
State and Nationals of Other States (1966)." The Convention is administered by the World Bank in
Washington D.C. Id.
123. The Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID are available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm.
124. NAFTA, supra note 113, art. 1120; Roundtable Discussion, supra note 112, at 226.
125. Shenkmansupra note 117, at 181;PrivateRights, supranote 3, at Il.
126. Private Rights, supra note 3, at 11; Wagner, supra note 3, at 474, 483.
127. NAFTA, supra note 113, art. 2009(2). Typically, panelists are private lawyers. Martin
Wagner, Trading Human Rights for Corporate Profits: Global Trade Policy Weakens Protection for
Health, the Environment, RACE, POVERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Summer 2004, at 26.
128. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 113, at 227.
129. NAFTA, supra note 113, art. 1123; Private Rights, supra note 3, at 39; Roundtable
Discussion, supra note 112, at 227; Vicki Been, Does an International "'Regulatory Takings"
Doctrine Make Sense, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 49, 60 (2002).
130. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 113, at 227.
131. Id.at214,228.
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come into the dispute, and the fact that they want to keep and preserve a certain
continuing relationship. The interpretation of an obligation that a state, as a
signatory to a treaty, puts forward one day may well rebound on them the next
day. So there is a real interest in having a comprehensive, logical, and systematic
approach to the interpretation of the substantive obligations. That is not
necessarily there in the investor-state context. 132
Lori Wallach, another panelist at the 2004 symposium, echoed Kinear's
point:
[In the investor-to-state model] it is a private party with a particular interest-
stockowners' profits, for instance-trying to have an interpretation about their
narrow interests, relative to a whole set of public issues. 133
In a similar vein, Martin Wagner of the environmental group Earthjustice
has commented:
[l]t is clear that the procedure surrounding the investor-state process is one-sided,
lacks transparency and does not have the safeguards to the public provided by
domestic court processes. Further, the basic legitimacy of the process is
challenged by the ability of foreign investors to bypass local laws and legal
processes in favor of international rights and processes domestic businesses do
not enjoy ... In short, the investor-state process as currently designed and
implemented is shockingly unsuited to the task of balancing private rights against
public goods in a legitimate and constructive manner. 134
D. Chapter 11 As a Sword Instead of a Shield
Another source of controversy regarding Chapter 11 concerns the threat of
Chapter 11 arbitration claims being used to preemptively attack domestic
regulatory standard-setting and enforcement decisions rather than as a protective
defense. 135
Gustavo Alanis-Ortega, President of the Mexican Environmental Law
Center (Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental), notes that the perceived
negative impacts of Chapter 11 include "the chilling effect on regulators and the
use of its provisions as a weapon by some multinational corporations against
environmental protection. . ."136 The Joint Public Advisory Committee of the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation reached the same
conclusion in a briefing paper: "[T]he provisions [of Chapter 11] have gone
from being tools of last-resort protection from unfair treatment to weapons of
choice for preventing or attacking unfavorable regulations - they have gone
from shield to sword."' 137
132. Id. at 228.
133. Id. at 234.
134. Private Rights, supra note 3, at 46.
135. Id. at 16; Wagner, supra note 3, at 466 (stating that it is "unprecedented" for companies
to use protections against foreign expropriation to challenge government measures protecting health
and the environment); NAFTA's Threat, supra note 111, at 79.
136. Gustavo Alanis-Ortega, Citizens Panel Sees Faults and Suggests Reform, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, July-Aug. 2003, at 38.
137. INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., NAFTA'S CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE CEC'S JOINT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE (June 2002).
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Aaron Cosbey, environmental economist and senior advisor for trade and
investment at the International Institute for Sustainable Development in
Winnipeg, noted in a 2005 essay:
The substantive provisions of Chapter 11 are being tested in the early years of the
agreement by imaginative claimants who seek to stretch its intended
interpretations to afford ever greater protections for investors. Those protections
may come at the expense of other public policy objectives ... Moreover, as such
claims notch up victories, the mere threat of a Chapter 11 suit may constitute an
attractive weapon in the arsenal of firms looking to forestall or weaken
regulations that affect them. 138
According to Martin Wagner, the threat of a Chapter 11 arbitration claim is
"now a routine lobbying instrument." 139 This lobbying instrument is particularly
strong because claimants are not required to make public the notice of intent to
submit a claim to arbitration, and thus, the claims receive limited public
scrutiny. 14 0 Furthermore, not only have investors claimed that government
measures violated Chapter I l's investment rules, but some now have claimed
that "when a government breaches [any] international obligations, it [] also
breaches Chapter I I's oblifation to treat investors in accordance with minimum
international standards." Observers are concerned that the threat of liability
for government regulation will induce governments to back off on
environmental regulation and enforcement. 142
E. Catylyst For IISD Model Agreement
Dissatisfaction with the substantive and procedural provisions of NAFTA's
Chapter 11 (as well as other current and proposed international investment
treaties) has prompted proposals for new rules and dispute resolution
mechanisms that should be included in multilateral investment agreements. The
Canada-based International Institute for Sustainable Development ("IISD")
released one of the most thoughtful and comprehensive of these proposals in
April 2005. The IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for
Sustainable Development ("IISD Model Agreement") contains the types of
138. Aaron Cosbey, The Road to Hell? Investor Protections in NAFTA's Chapter 11, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 168 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., Earthscan
2005) (italics in original).
139. Private Rights, supra note 3, at 16.
140. Id. at 42.
141. Id. at 17. Section 1105(1) of NAFTA states that "each Party shall accord to investments
of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security."
142. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 113, at 220, 234 (stating that the threat of paying for
Chapter II claims is "the sword of Damocles of the prospect of the federal treasury of a particular
government being really put at risk by a particular company's claim. Frankly, this has more of a
chilling effect than the prospect of actual damages being paid out. So you have the Ethyl case in
Canada, where Canada ultimately reversed its ban on the gasoline additive MMT and paid a small
amount of compensation to avoid the overhanging sword of the huge threatened compensation");
NAFTA 's Threat, supra note 111, at 81 (stating that successive Chapter I I NAFTA claims will
"chill public interest policies.").
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clarifying and balancing provisions that many have alleged the text of NAFTA's
Chapter 11 now lacks and needs. The introduction to the IISD Model Agreement
explains:
The current model for investment agreement was developed in the political
context of the 1950s and 1960s - a period characterized by fear of the spread of
communism and concern for the impacts of decolonization on business interests
in newly independent developing countries. Given this origin, the initial
agreements were singularly focused on just one aspect of the investment process:
the protection of foreign capital and investments...
[T]he arbitration process developed to address disputes under the agreements -
with the primary focus on investor-state arbitrations - turned out in recent years
to be rife with conflicts of interest, and failed to meet the same basic criteria of
legitimacy, transparency and accountability applied to the national dispute
settlement processes it now routinely displaces...
Whatever its merits at the time, the model for HAs [international investment
agreements] developed 50 years ago no longer meets the needs of the global
economy in the 2l' t century. 143
A summary of all the provisions in the IISD Model Agreement is beyond
the scope of this article, but the provisions that pertain to matters at issue in the
Texans' NAFTA claim concerning Rio Grande water resources merit our
attention.
First, in terms of the definition of an "investment," Article 2(C)(v)(b) of the
IISD Model Agreement requires that "there is a significant physical presence of
the investment in the host state." 144 This "significant physical presence"
requirement is also bolstered by Article 4(2), which provides that "A Party may
deny the benefits of this Agreement to an investor of another party . . . if the
enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other
Party...", 4 5
Second, the IISD Model Agreement seeks to articulate a more balanced
legal relationship between the goals of investor protection and sustainable
development. Article 14(D) states that "Investors and investments shall not
manage or operate the investments in a manner that circumvents international
environmental, labor and human rights obligations to which the host state and/or
home state are Parties" 146 and Article 18(E) provides that "A host state may
initiate a counterclaim before any tribunal established pursuant to this
Agreement for damages resulting from an alleged breach of this Agreement."
14 7
Additionally, Article 25(B) establishes that "In accordance with customary
143. INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT v (2005).
144. Id. at 2.
145. Id. at4.
146. Id. at 10.
147. Id. at 11.
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international law and other general principles of international law, host states
have the right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that development in
their territory is consistent with the goals and principles of sustainable
development" 148 and Article 34(C) states that "The Parties hereby re-affirm
their obligations under international environmental and human rights agreements
to which they are a Party."
149
Third, the IISD Model Agreement contains several recommendations to
improve dispute resolution mechanisms. Article 40 calls for the creation of a
permanent and independent Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and provides the
DSB with the sole authority to select panelists to hear dispute resolution
cases. 150 Article 40(h) calls for the creation of an appellate division within the
DSB, composed of full-time individuals with recognized expertise in the
"matters covered by this Agreement" (which includes sustainable development
law and policies).15 1 Article 46(A) requires that all documents relating to the
dispute resolution process (including "pleadings, evidence and decisions") shall
be available to the public.152 Finally, Article 48 is entitled "Governing law in
disputes" and 48(k) provides in pertinent part that "When a claim is submitted to
a panel or an appeal tribunal, it shall be decided in accordance with this
Agreement, national law of the host state, and the general principles of
international law.'153
It remains to be seen what impact the IISD Model Agreement will have on
the implementation of NAFTA's Chapter 11 or on negotiations over other
multilateral investment treaties. Regardless of its potential future impact,
however, the text of the IISD Model Agreement is useful in itself for identifying
the ways that existing multilateral investment treaties and provisions could be
interpreted or revised to respond to human health, environmental protection and
public accountability concerns.
IV.
TEXANS' NAFTA CLAIM FOR UNDELIVERED Rio GRANDE WATER
The Texans submitted their notice of intent to seek arbitration under
Chapter 11 on August 27, 2004 and later submitted their request for arbitration
on January 19, 2005.154 Pursuant to the arbitration options set forth in Chapter
148. Id. at 14.
149. Id. at 18.
150. Id. at 21.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 24.
153. Id. at 25.
154. Texans' Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Section B, Chapter 11
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (2004) [hereinafter NO1],
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Texas/TexasNoticeOflntent.pdf. Texans' Request for
Arbitration Under the Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings
by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the North American Free
Trade Agreement between Bayview Irrigation District et al., and The United Mexican States (2005)
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11, the Texans elected to proceed under the Additional Facility Rules of the
ICSID in their request for arbitration.
155
The Texans base their claim on Mexico's alleged violations of Articles
1102, 1105, and 1110 of NAFTA. The Texans assert that they possess the "fully
adjudicated exclusive legal right to withdraw 1,227,596 acre-feet of water
annually from the lower Rio Grande River"'156 and allege the following to
support their claim that such claimed rights were damaged:
Under the 1944 Rivers Treaty, the United States is entitled to receive one-third of
the Rio Grande's flow in the main channel, but such one-third must not be less
than 350,000 af annually. 157
From 1992 to 1997, Mexico delivered only 726,151 acre-feet of water, 1,023,849
less than required under the 1944 Rivers Treaty. During the same period, the
Texans allege nearly 4,350,000 af of water was stored in 12 Mexican reservoirs to
meet Mexico's own demands; and through October of 1999, another 5,900,000 af
of water was stored in the reservoirs. 158
By diverting the water that belonged to the Texans, the Texans allege that Mexico
has thereby nationalized or expropriated, or taken a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation, of the Texans' investment, without
compensation and due process in violation of Article 1110 of NAFTA (Article
1110 claim).159
From 1997 to 2000, Mexico delivered only 407,088 af of water to the United
States and by October 2002, Mexico's total deficit was 1,476,181 af.160
From 1992 to 2002, Mexico captured and diverted "an investment (approximate
1,013,056 af of irrigation water) located in Mexico and owned by Claimants.'
By diverting this water for use by Mexican farmers, Mexico increased its
agricultural production and harmed the Claimants' agricultural production. The
Texans allege that in doing so Mexico treated United States investors'
investments less favorably than it treated its own investors' investments and
thereby violated Article 1102 of NAFTA (Article 1102 claim). 162
Satellite photos taken by the Texas Agriculture Commissioner of Mexican
reservoirs and irrigated croplgnd show that Mexico possessed sufficient water to
fulfill its Treaty obligations.
Based on these allegations and arguments, the Texans contend that Mexico had
adequate water to fulfill its water delivery obligations under the 1944 Rivers
Treaty but simply chose not to deliver it.
The thrust of the Texans' Chapter 11 claim is the allegation that they are
[hereinafter Notice ofArbitration],
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Texas/TexasClaimsNOA- 19-01-05.pdf.
155. Notice ofArbitration, supra note 154, at 3.
156. NOI, supra note 153, at 1.
157. Id. at 4-5. Throughout the rest of the NOI, the Texans assert they are the legal owners
of the right to divert 1,013,056 af of water from the Rio Grande.
158. Id. at 6; Notice ofArbitration, supra note 154, at 36.
159. NOI, supra note 154, at 4.
160. Id. at 7; Notice ofArbitration, supra note 154, at 36.
161. NOI, supra note 154, at 3.
162. Id.; Notice ofArbitration, supro note 154, at 32-33.
163. Id.; NOI, supra note 153, at 7.
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the legal owners of 1,219,521 af of irrigation water that was wrongfully diverted
from the Rio Grande by Mexico, "the expropriation and diversion of which has
severely damaged the ability of Texans and the farmers they represent to
produce crops."164 The Texans claim they possess an "integrated investment"
under the definition of Article 1139(g) of NAFTA that allegedly includes: 165
[R]ights to water located in Mexico; facilities to store and distribute this water for
irrigation and domestic consumption; irrigated fields and farms; farm buildings
and machinery; and ongoing irrigated agricultural businesses. Claimants have
invested millions of dollars in an integrated water delivery system, including
pumps, aqueducts, canals, other facilities for the storage and conveyance of their
water to the land on which it is used... Each Claimant's Investment is entirely
predicated on this right to receive water located in Mexican tributaries. 166
Between 1992 and 2002, the Texans allege that "nearly $1 billion has been
lost in decreased business activity and that 30,000 jobs have been precluded."' 167
The value of the irrigation water at issue was estimated to be worth $350 to
$730 per af. 168 Allowing for losses of 25 percent for evaporation, diversion, and
transportation, the total loss for depriving the Texans of 914,641 af of water
(1,219,521 af minus 25 percent equals 914,641) at this estimated value ranges
from $320,124,350 to $667,687,930.169 As relief, the Texans seek
compensation for the expropriated water ($320,124,350 to $667,687,930) or the
economic losses caused by Mexico's less favorable treatment of the Texans'
investments ($667,687,930), including interest from October 2002 and costs. 17 0
A. Tulare Lake as Prelude
Later in this article we will analyze the merits of the Texans' water claim
against Mexico under Chapter 11 and the 1944 Rivers Treaty. We will also
consider the relation of the Texans' NAFTA water claim to the parallel IBWC
proceedings on the question of Mexico's compliance with its Rio Grande water
delivery obligations under the 1944 Rivers Treaty. However, prior to this
analysis, some discussion of recent developments in United States law on
"takings" is required, for these domestic legal developments served as a catalyst
for and precursor to the filing of the Texans' NAFTA water claim against
Mexico.
Two of the three attorneys representing the Texans in their NAFTA water
164. Id.; NOI, supra note 154, at 7.
165. Notice ofArbitration, supra note 154, at 27.
166. Id.
167. NOI, supra note 154, at 7.
168. Id. at 8; Notice ofArbitration, supra note 153, at 39. These figures are based on John R.
C. Robinson's study Alternative Approaches to Estimate the Impact of Irrigation Water Shortage on
Rio Grande Valley Agriculture (May 17, 2002). Robinson is an associate economics professor at
Texas A&M University.
169. Notice ofArbitration, supra note 154, at 39. Because Claimants originally alleged they
were the owners of 1,013,056 af, they originally alleged damages in the amount of $265,927,200 to
$554,648,150. NOI, supra note 154, at 8.
170. Notice ofArbitration, supra note 153, at 39.
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claim against Mexico previously served as lead counsel for California farming
interests in a domestic lawsuit against the United States that alleged the
appropriation of water by the federal government without adequate
compensation. This lawsuit led by Nancie Marzulla and Roger Marzulla resulted
in a 2001 decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims in the case of
Tulare Lake Basin Storage District v. United States ("Tulare Lake").17 1 In
examining the results of the Tulare Lake litigation, one can find the strategic
genesis of the subsequent Rio Grande NAFTA litigation.
In Tulare Lake, the federal National Marines Fisheries Service ("NMFS")
had issued a biological opinion concluding that the operation of California's
State Water Project ("SWP") and the federal Central Valley Project ("CVP")
would jeopardize the existence of the Delta smelt and Chinook salmon, both
protected under the federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). NMFS issued
reasonable and prudent alternatives ("RPAs") to avoid jeopardizing the species.
A 1985 agreement requires the California Department of Water Resources
("DWR") to coordinate its operation of the SWP with the federal operation of
the CVP to ensure compliance with the ESA. 172 Due to this agreement, DWR's
operation of the SWP is subject to the consultation requirements of the ESA.
Here, DWR was required to implement the RPAs adopted by NMFS, and this
implementation reduced the amount of water delivered to the SWP and CVP,
which in turn resulted in a reduction of water availability of approximately
0.11% and 2.92% for Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District and Kern
County Water Agency, respectively. 173 The plaintiffs themselves did not
possess water right permits, but held delivery contracts with DWR who was the
permit holder. 
174
The plaintiffs in Tulare Lake alleged that the reduction in water deliveries
amounted to a takin of property under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 175 The United States argued, inter alia, that plaintiffs' water
rights were subject to limitations such as the public trust and reasonable use
doctrines under California law that allowed for the protection of fish and
wildlife. 176 The United States also argued that the delivery reductions reflected
these limitations, and that by implementing background principles of state law,
compensation was unnecessary.177
In a 2001 decision, Judge John Weise of the United States Court of Federal
Claims held that the action by the federal government constituted a taking of the
171. Tulare Lake, supra note 5.
172. Brian Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1,
5 (2002); Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act and
the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 558-59 (2002).
173. Gray, supra note 172, at 5-6; Benson, supra note 172, at 560; Brittany K.T. Kauffman,
Note, What Remains of the Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights After Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage District v. United States?, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 837, 870, 875 (2003).
174. Benson, supra note 172, at 560; Kauffman, supra note 173, at 864.
175. Tulare Lake, supra note 5, at 314.
176. Id. at 320.
177. Id. at 317, 320.
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plaintiffs' water rights occurred by the Federal Government and thus
compensation was due. 178 Specifically, the court held that a physical taking had
occurred because the plaintiffs lost their right to use the water, which amounted
to a "complete extinction of all value" of the water right. 179 Because a physical
taking had occurred, the United States Court of Claims found that compensation
was required regardless of the degree of intrusion on the right. 18
0
The 2001 Tulare Lake has proven controversial for several reasons. First,
there are concerns that high-level staff involved in the dispute within the
administration of United States President George W. Bush were highly
sympathetic to the California fanning plaintiffs' takings claims, and therefore
not particularly troubled by the prospect of losing the case. For example, Gale
Norton, the then Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior
(which oversees NMFS' implementation of the ESA and the federal Bureau of
Reclamation's operation of the CVP) under President Bush, has long advocated
for an expansive interpretation of property rights and takings claims and a
restricted interpretation of the ESA. 81 Similarly, the attorney that represented
the United States in the Tulare Lake litigation, Assistant Attorney General
Thomas Sansonetti, spent much of his earlier legal career representin industries
seeking to limit environmental protection regulation such as the ESA. 82
Gale Norton's and Thomas Sansonetti's role in the dispute did little to
instill confidence among environmentalists that the United States would mount
an effective and vigorous defense in the Tulare Lake litigation. Following the
2001 ruling, lawyers for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
the California Attorney General, the California State Water Resources Control
Board, and a roster of prominent water law professors all urged the Bush
Administration to appeal the decision.183 Instead of appealing the Tulare Lake
decision, the Bush Administration chose to settle with the plaintiffs in late 2004
for $16.7 million. 184 The settlement was not viewed favorably by United States
Congressman George Miller of California, former chairman of the House of
Representatives Resources Committee: "[T]he Bush Administration had no
reason to settle this case ... [U]nfortunately, this is part of a larger pattern. No
matter what the situation - a changing economy, severe drought, environmental
crisis - the Bush Administration believes that the country's largest farms have a
right to all the water they desire."' 185
178. Id. at 314, 324.
179. Id. at 318-20.
180. Id. at 319.
181. John D. Echeverria, Nominee's lnterior Stress, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 22, 2001
182. Bush Appointees Come with Biases, ATLANTA-CONST. J., Jan. 20, 2002.
183. Mike Taugher, U.S. Water Pact Makes Big Waves, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Jan. 18,
2005; Don Thompson, Government Agrees to Reimburse District for Water Used to Save Fish,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 21, 2004.
184. Press Release, Congressman George Miller, Tulare Lake Settlement Could Have
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Second, there has been extensive scholarly criticism of the analysis relied
upon by Judge Weise in his decision in Tulare Lake. 186 Brian Gray, a water law
professor at the University of California's Hastings College of Law in San
Francisco, has presented perhaps the most cogent critique of Tulare Lake. In his
2002 article entitled The Property Right in Water, Professor Gray states:
Judge Wiese acknowledged that all California water rights are subject to the
requirement of reasonable use, the public trust doctrine, and principles of
nuisance law, but he rejected the United States' argument that the plaintiffs'
rights to water service were limited by these rules... 187
These laws "require a complex balancing of interests," Judge Wiese explained,
and call for "an exercise of discretion for which this court is not suited..."188
In essence, the court decided that an appropriator is legally entitled to engage in
(and has property rights to) any conduct that is authorized by its water rights
permit or license. This interpretation oversimplifies - and therefore
misapprehends - the nature of California water rights... 189
By declining to consider the effects of the reasonable use and public trust
doctrines on SWP contractors' rights to full water service under conditions that
would be likely to jeopardize two species of fish protected by the Endangered
Species Act, the Court of Federal Claims thus abjured its first responsibility in a
water rights taking case - to determine whether the plaintiffs in fact have
'property' capable of being taken by the government action at issue... 190
I have written previously on the history of reasonable use in California and have
come to the conclusion that water rights are - and always have been - fragile.
Rights of diversion, storage and use that are granted in permits, licenses, pre-1914
appropriative rights, and riparian rights are neither fixed nor vested. The
California Supreme Court has long held that a use that was perfectly lawful when
first recognized may not be lawful because changing circumstances render the use
unreasonable. The changed circumstance may be a new, competing consumptive
use of the water or it may be recognition of the cumulative effects of long-
standing water uses on water quality, navigation, fisheries and other in situ
uses... For our purposes, it is adequate simply to emphasize that this historical
analysis must take place. If it does not - if the courts compel the government to
compensate water users when the government acts to prevent an unreasonable use
that is not part of the water right - then water users will receive a windfall.191
The points raised by Professor Gray and other critics of the Tulare Lake
decision later found expression in a subsequent 2005 decision by Judge Francis
Allegra of the United States Court of Federal Claims. In the case of Klamath
Irrigation District v. United States ("Klamath Irrigation"), the Court faced
another Fifth Amendment claim brought by Nancie Marzulla and Roger
186. See Gray, supra note 171; Benson, supra note 171, at 576 (stating "In short, contrary to
the Tulare court's assumption, the plaintiffs did not have a right to a specific amount of water. In
California, no one does."); Kauffman, supra note 172, at 837; Coi S. Parobek, Of Farmers' Takes
and Fishes' Takings: Fifth Amendment Compensation Claims When the Endangered Species Act and
Western Water Rights Collide, 27 IIARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2003).
187. Gray, supra note 172, at 8.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 9.
190. Id. at 11.
191. Id. at 16-17.
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Marzulla, once again alleging that the federal government's enforcement of the
ESA resulted in the uncompensated taking of farmers' property interest in
water. 19 2 This time the farmers at issue were located in Oregon.
Rejecting Judge Wiese's approach, Judge Allegra held that the nature of the
Oregon farmers' property interest in Klamath River water was informed by the
extent of the farmers' water rights under Oregon water law.193 He then
proceeded to wade into Oregon water law to answer this question. A detailed
analysis of the holding in Klamath Irrigation is beyond the scope of this article.
What is critical, however, is that at the end of his analysis, Judge Allegra found
that the farmers had failed to state a viable constitutional Fifth Amendment
takings claim, and that it was doubtful whether they were entitled to any
compensation under the terms of the contracts with the federal government. In
reaching this conclusion, the opinion in Klamath Irrigation did much to distance
itself from and discredit the previous Tulare Lake holding. Judge Allegra held:
In arguing, despite the foregoing, that the Bureau [of Reclamation] effectuated a
taking of their contract rights, plaintiffs harken to this court's decision in Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States [citation omitted].. . [W]ith
all due respect, Tulare appears to be wrong on some counts, incomplete in others,
and distinguishable, at all events.
For one thing, Tulare failed to consider whether the contract rights at issue were
limited so as not to preclude enforcement of the ESA. Rather, the court treated the
contract rights possessed by the districts essentially as absolute, without
adequately considering whether they were limited in the case of water shortage,
either by prior contracts, prior appropriations or some other state law principle
[citation omitted] .. .Thus, although the court noted that there were agreements
between the United States and the State of California creating a coordinated
pumping system, it did not examine those agreements to see whether they, like
the district contracts here, limited the plaintiffs' rights derivatively. [citation
omitted] ... Rather, it focused on the districts' contracts with state agencies as if
they were free-standing. [citation omitted] Nor did the court consider whether the
plaintiffs' claimed use of the water violated accepted state doctrines, including
those designed to protect fish and wildlife, finding that issue to be reserved
exclusively to the state courts. [citation omitted] Because the state courts had not
ruled on those issues, this court refised to rule on them as well. As a result, it
awarded just compensation for the taking of interests that may well not exist
under state law ... 194
On these counts, this court disagrees with the approach taken in Tulare and
concludes that decision lends no support to the views espoused by plaintiffs here.
. . 195
[T]he court is mindful that []this ruling may disappoint a number of individuals
who have long invested effort and expense in developing their lands based on the
expectation that the waters of the Klamath Basin would continue to flow,
uninterrupted, for irrigation. But, those expectations, no matter how
understandable, do not give those landowners any more property rights as against
192. Klamath Irrigation, supra note 8.
193. Id.at516-31.
194. Id. at 537-38.
195. Id. at 538.
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the United States, and the application of the Endangered Species Act, than they
actually obtained and possess. Like it or not, water rights, though undeniably
precious, are subject to the same rules that govern all forms of property - they
enjoy no elevated or more protected status. 196
To the extent that the Texans intended to export aspects of the domestic
Tulare Lake holding into their international Rio Grande NAFTA claim, this
legal strategy is now greatly undermined by the holding in Klamath Irrigation.
Moreover, as discussed below in section IV(C), there are additional
considerations relating to diplomacy and foreign affairs that suggest the
approach taken in Tulare Lake in regard to a purely domestic dispute would be
highly inappropriate in the transborder context of the Mexico-United States Rio
Grande dispute.
B. Merits of Texans' Claim under Chapter 11 and 1944 Rivers Treaty
A close examination of the relevant provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 and
the 1944 Rivers Treaty reveals that they do not support the Texans' Rio Grande
claim against Mexico. The primary hurdle for the Texans will likely be
establishing that they possess a quantifiable "investment" in Mexico under the
1944 Rivers Treaty, a prerequisite to establishing any potential claim to
compensation under NAFTA Chapter 11.
First, as noted above, the terms of the 1944 Rivers Treaty do not provide
Mexico with an unqualified obligation (and the United States with an
unqualified right) to receive a specified amount of Rio Grande water in any
particular calendar year or even in any particular five-year cycle. Rather, the
terms of the 1944 Rivers Treaty specifically contemplate and expressly
recognize that it may not be feasible for Mexico to deliver 350,000 af of Rio
Grande water in any given year during periods of reduced rainfall. Furthermore,
in such drought periods, it may not be feasible for Mexico to deliver a total of
1,750,000 af (average of 350,000 yearly over five years) over the course of any
given five-year cycle. 197 The 1944 Rivers Treaty establishes a mechanism by
which, when such drought conditions arise, Mexico is permitted to "carry over"
the water debt accumulated during a previous five-year cycle for payment into
the subsequent five-year cycle.19 Moreover, the 1944 Rivers Treaty clearly
identifies the IBWC as the forum to seek diplomatic resolution of disputes over
the occurrence of drought conditions, the amount of any water debt
accumulated, and the terms and timing of paying back any accumulated water
debt. 199
Therefore, to the extent that the Texans' "investment" derives from the
196. Id. at 540.
197. Treaty, supra note 2, at 1227.
198. Id. There are similar provisions for when the U.S. is unable to deliver to Mexico water
from the Colorado River. Id. at 1237-38.
199. G. GRAHAM WAITE, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES VOL.
I1 137 (Wells A. Hutchins ed., 1977); U.S. Attorney Brief supra note 78, at 12.
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United States' water entitlements under the 1944 Rivers Treaty, such investment
is also subject to the conditions and limitations on the United States' entitlement
set forth in the terms of the Treaty. Under the provisions of the 1944 Rivers
Treaty, the United States' claim to Rio Grande water is subject to the right of
Mexico to reduce deliveries for any given year or for any five-cycle when
drought conditions arise, and to repay this water debt subject to terms and
timetable established through the IBWC resolution process. Consistent with the
1944 Rivers Treaty, Mexico reduced its Rio Grande deliveries to the United
States during the 1992 to 1997 and 1997 to 2002 cycles, accumulated a water
debt, and then, with the IBWC's assistance, negotiated an agreement with the
United States in March 2005 for repaying its accumulated water debt.20 0 On
September 30, 2005, the IBWC announced that, in accordance with the terms of
the March 2005 agreement, "Mexico has delivered sufficient volumes of water
to pay off the deficit in its entirety."
20 1
The Texans' NAFTA water claim therefore seeks recognition of
entitlements and rights under the 1944 Rivers Treaty that the United States does
not even possess. The 1944 Rivers Treaty provides a mechanism by which
accumulated water debts are repaid through enhanced water deliveries in
subsequent cycle periods as determined by the IBWC or through state-to-state
negotiations. Additional water deliveries, rather than monetary damages, are the
remedy set forth in the agreement for making up previous under-deliveries. The
notion of "investment" that underlies the Texans' NAFTA Chapter 11 claim for
damages therefore disregards the circumscribed nature - in terms of quantities,
remedies and dispute resolution procedures - of the United States' entitlements
to Rio Grande water. More to the point, the Texans' blanket assertion that the
1944 Rivers Treaty entitled the United States to no less than 350,000 af annually
amounts to a distorted oversimplification of the complex regime set forth by the
Treaty. 2
02
Second, Article 1139(h) of NAFTA provides that an "investment" under
Chapter 11 can include "interests arising from the commitment of capital or
other resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory"
and Article 1139(i) states that an "investment" can include "contracts involving
the presence of an investor's property in the territory of the Party." 20 3 The use
of the phrase "in such territory" suggests that Chapter 1 's protections were
intended to deal with foreign investments or economic activities located in the
host country against whom the Chapter 11 claim is brought, rather than
investments or economic activities located in the home country of the foreign
investors. Nevertheless, in the present NAFTA claim, the economic losses for
which the Texans seek compensation relates to economic activities undertaken
200. USIBWC Press Release, supra note 107.
201. Announcement, Int'l Boundary Water Comm'n (Sept. 30, 2005),
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/PAO/CURPRESS/2005/WaterDebtPaidFinal.pdf.
202. NOI, supra note 154, at 4-5.
203. NAFTA, supra note 113, art. 1139 (emphasis added).
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by the Texans in the United States rather than Mexico. In particular, the Texans
seek compensation for losses associated with the following activities that appear
to take place solely in Texas: "facilities to store and distribute this water for
irrigation and domestic consumption; irrigated fields and farms; farm buildings
and machinery; and ongoing irrigated agricultural businesses.. .integrated water
delivery system, including pumps, aqueducts, canals, and other facilities for the
storage and conveyance of their water to the land on which it is used."
2 04
The Texans allege that such Texas-based activities fall within the scope of
Chapter lI's investment protections because they constitute an "integrated"
investment under Article 1139(g) of NAFTA that is closely related to Rio
Grande water provided from Mexico. 205 Article 1139(g) does not use the term
"integrated" investment but instead provides that an "investment" under Chapter
11 can include "real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in
the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business
purposes." 2 06 In essence, the Texans appear to argue that they obtained an
independent legal right to receive a certain quantified amount of Rio Grande
water from Mexico because of their anticipation and desire to continue receiving
such an amount and use it for their economic gain. Such reasoning, however, is
flawed; similar to Klamath Irrigation, expectation and hope alone do not create
an ownership interest. 2
0 7
The Texans' contention here calls to mind the claim rejected by Judge
Allegra in Klamath Irrigation. Judge Allegra recognized that the plaintiffs had
made investments based on the expectation of interrupted diversions of Klamath
River waters, but clarified: "[T]hose expectations, no matter how
understandable, do not give those landowners any more property rights.., than
they actually obtained and possess. Like it or not, water rights, though
undeniably precious, are subject to the same rules that govern all forms of
property...208 This analysis seems equally on point in evaluating the merits of
the Texans' claim to a property interest in Mexico's delivery of specified
quantities of Rio Grande water.
Third, since the 1944 Rivers Treaty is between the Government of Mexico
and the Government of the United States, it is unclear whether the Texans have
proper standing to enforce the terms of the Treaty or in fact possess any rights
under the Treaty. In private contract law, an intended third-party beneficiary
may, under certain circumstances, have standing to enforce the terms of a
contract between other parties. It is highly questionable, however, whether the
enforcement standing occasionally afforded to third-party beneficiaries under
private contract law provides a proper basis for the Texans to seek enforcement
of United States' rights against another sovereign nation under the terms of an
204. Notice ofArbitration, supra note 153, 27.
205. Notice ofArbitration, supra note 153, 28, 29, 35.
206. NAFTA, supra note 113, art. 1139.
207. Klamath Irrigation District, supra note 8, at 540.
208. Id.
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international treaty. Such an extension of the third-party beneficiary standing
would seem particularly unwarranted given that the United States has already
pressed and resolved its Rio Grande rights against Mexico under the 1944
Rivers Treaty through IBWC proceedings.
Notably, the issue of private enforcement of 1944 Rivers Treaty rights was
addressed in domestic litigation currently pending over the rights of Mexican
farmers to groundwater in the transborder Mexicali Valley aquifer. In the case of
Consejo de Desarollo Economico de Mexicali et al. v. United States of America
("Consejo"), the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") submitted a brief
to the federal District Court on September 19, 2005 arguing:
It is well-established that absent a provision specifically contemplating the right
to enforce the terms of a treaty by an entity or individual other than the parties,
only the sovereigns involved may enforce treaty provisions, and any such
discussions take place through diplomatic channels ... 209
The 1944 Treaty did not create private rights of action for individuals.210
If the 1944 Rivers Treaty is not susceptible to private enforcement by Mexican
farmers against the United States, then presumably it is also not susceptible to
private enforcement by Texas farmers against Mexico.
Finally, the expansive notion of "investment" that underlies the Texans'
NAFTA water claim is at odds with the ruling made by the Chapter 11
arbitration panel in Methanex Corporation v. United States of America
("Methanex").2 11 The Chapter 11 claim in Methanex was brought by a
manufacturer of methanol, one of the main ingredients in methyl tertiary-butyl
ether ("MTBE").2 12 MTBE is a gasoline additive that was banned by the State
of California because releases of the additive from underground storage tanks
and pipelines contaminated drinking water resources. 2 13 In a decision issued on
August 7, 2002, the Methanex panel dismissed claims for compensation for
damages on the grounds that Methanex Corporation did not constitute an
"investor" under Chapter 11 because its investments in the production of
methanol were insufficiently linked with California's ban on MTBE.2 14
Methanex Corporation had argued its methanol investments fell within Chapter
11 's scope because these investments were "affected" by the MTBE ban.2 15 For
reasons adhering to Judge Allegra's opinion in Klamath District, the Methanex
panel rejected the "affected" standard as insufficient, reasoning that an endless
209. U.S. Attorney Brief supra note 78, at 17 (citing Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States,
663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir.
1988); Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Valot, 625
F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980).
210. U.S. Attorney Brief supra note 79, at 17.
211. Methanex Corp. v. United States, First Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., Aug. 7, 2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/12613.pdf.
212. Id. at 14.
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number of parties could be potentially affected by any government measure. 2 16
The "integrated investment" argument put forth by the Texans in their
NAFTA Rio Grande claim is akin to the "affected by" argument previously put
forth by Methanex Corporation. The Texans essentially maintain that they had a
property interest in Mexico's delivery of certain quantities of Rio Grande water
because the Texans' economic activities in the United States were adversely
impacted when these quantities of water were not delivered. The Methanex
NAFTA panel ruling suggests that the Texans' circular reasoning here should be
rejected.
C. Parallel IB WC Dispute Resolution Proceedings
Aside from the hurdles presented by the language contained in Chapter 11
and the 1944 Rivers Treaty, the Texans' NAFTA water claim may also be
hindered by the IBWC's longstanding efforts to resolve the Rio Grande water
debt dispute between Mexico and the United States. Two issues arise when
parallel IBWC proceedings are invoked. The first aspect relates to whether a
NAFTA Chapter 11 panel has proper jurisdiction over the Rio Grande dispute,
and the second relates to, even if it has jurisdiction, whether the NAFTA
Chapter 11 panel should properly defer to the IBWC's findings and resolution
for determining Mexico's compliance with the 1944 Rivers Treaty.
1. Questions of Jurisdiction
In terms of jurisdiction, previous Chapter 11 arbitration panels have not
found their jurisdiction lacking on the grounds that other non-NAFTA
international agreements and forums also pertain to the subject matter giving
rise to the underlying Chapter 11 claim. For example, Pope & Talbot Inc., a U.S.
timber company, filed a claim against Canada in 1999 that involved certain
restrictions imposed pursuant to the United States-Canada Agreement on Trade
in Softwood Lumber and which was related to disputes before the World Trade
Organization and the United States International Trade Commission.2 17 The
involvement of other international treaties and forums did not cause the Pope &
Talbot Chapter 11 panel to decline the arbitration submission, which eventually
led to a ruling against Canada. 2 18 Similarly, S.D. Meyers, another U.S.
company, filed a Chapter 11 claim in 1998 against Canada in response to
Canada's imposition of an interim ban on the export of polycholorinated
biphenyls ("PCBs") based on the provisions of the Basel Convention on the
216. Id.
217. Statement of Claim Under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission of
International Trade law and the North American Free Trade Agreement, Pope & Talbot Inc. v.
Government of Canada, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, March 25, 1999.
218. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., June
26, 2000), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/pubdoc7.pdf; Pope & Talbot v. Canada,
Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., Apr. 10, 2001), http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/AwardMerits-e.pdf.
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Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes ("Basel
Convention").2 1 9 In issuing a decision against Canada, the S.D. Meyers NAFTA
arbitration panel did not find that the dispute resolution provisions contained in
the Basel Convention restricted the availability of the Chapter 11 dispute
resolution process.
220
Although the Pope & Talbot and S.D. Meyers rulings provide some support
for the conclusion that parallel IBWC proceedings should not deprive a Chapter
11 arbitration panel of jurisdiction over the Texans' Rio Grande NAFTA claim
against Mexico, there are other considerations that suggest the jurisdictional
question should be revisited in this instance.
First, the Pope & Talbot and S.D. Meyers decisions have both been subject
to criticism for their disregard of the provisions of other non-NAFTA
international agreements and the ongoing proceedings of other non-NAFTA
international tribunals. A February 2005 report by the organization Public
Citizen noted that the Pope & Talbot decision:
• further complicate[s] a monumental trade dispute that already is being heard
in a variety of venues at once. . . One of the criticisms of the investor-to-state
process is that it allows a narrow private interest to trump what might be a
contrary public interest. When a government considers initiating a state-state
enforcement proceeding, it must consider how the action could implicate other
national goals or interests, and balance the immediate potential commercial gain
for U.S.- based business interests against long-term, broader interests - such as
the possibility of creating jurisprudence that might be turned against the country
in a later dispute. Not so with investor-state proceedings.221
On the subject of the S.D. Meyers ruling, the same report states:
In this case, Canada explicitly raised its obligations under a multilateral
environmental agreement (the Basel Convention) as a justification for its Interim
Order, temporary PCB export ban, and attempts to develop domestic PCB
treatment capacity. This case proves a concern raised by environmentalists during
the debate about NAFTA's approval: what would happen when NAFTA's
expansive rules required governments to act in violation of their obligations in the
scores or environmental treaties that many countries, including the NAFTA
nations, have signed?222
Although the considerations noted above may not have been given much
credence at the time of the Pope & Talbot and S.D. Meyers panels, such
considerations now merit closer attention in light of growing concerns regarding
the Chapter 11 process.
Second, the particular dispute resolution language in the 1944 Rivers
Treaty leave little doubt that Mexico and the United States identified the IBWC
as the appropriate international forum where disputes over non-compliance with
219. S.D. Meyers v. Canada, Statement of Claim (NAFTA, Ch. II Arb. Trib., Oct. 30,
1998), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myers3.pdf.
220. S.D. Meyers v. Canada, Partial Award (NAFTA, Ch. 11 Arb. Trib., Nov. 13, 2000),
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myersvcanadapartialawardfinal_13-1 1-O0.pdf.
221. Public Citizen, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES: LESSONS FOR THE
CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 41 (Feb. 2005).
222. Id. at 44.
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Rio Grande delivery obligations should be settled. Article 2 of the 1944 Rivers
Treaty states, "The application of the present Treaty, the regulation and exercise
of the rights and obligations which the two Governments assume there under,
and the settlement of all disputes to which its observance and execution may
give rise are hereby entrusted to the International Boundary and Water
Commission." 223 Moreover, Article 9(f) of the Treaty specifically provides the
IBWC with the authority to resolve delivery disputes related to drought
conditions. As discussed above, the IBWC brokered a resolution in March 2005
between Mexico and the United States in which, according to the IBWC,
"Mexico's water debt [was] completely eliminated."'224 Should a NAFTA
Chapter 11 panel later rule that Mexico must pay damages in addition to the
negotiated water deliveries agreed to in March 2005, this ruling could be viewed
as repudiation of, or at a minimum a reopening of, the current IBWC resolution.
Third, in the above-discussed pending domestic case of Consejo, the DOJ
recently advocated for an expansive view of the IBWC's dispute resolution
authority. 225 More specifically, the DOJ contended that the domestic court
lacked jurisdiction because the IBWC is the exclusive forum to resolve disputes
under the 1944 Rivers Treaty:
The 1944 Treaty, like many international agreements, foresaw the need for an
implementation and dispute resolution mechanism. Article 2 of the 1944 Treaty
assigns responsibility for application of the Treaty and the regulation and exercise
of the rights and obligations which devolve upon the U.S. and Mexican
governments thereunder to the IBWC ... 226
In the 1944 Treaty, the United States and Mexico created a dispute resolution
procedure consistent with the view that the disputes under the 1944 Treaty are to
be resolved through diplomacy. Article 24(d) could not be plainer in this regard,
empowering the IBWC "[t]o settle all differences that may arise between the two
Governments with respect to the interpretation or application of this Treaty... 227
In negotiating the apportionment of water on three international rivers, the
governments of the United States and Mexico necessarily made policy
determination and tradeoffs to arrive at a result that both governments considered
acceptable. Furthermore, the governments empowered the IBWC to settle any
disputes arising under the Treaty.228
Such arguments were presented in Consejo in an effort to persuade the
federal district court that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the Mexican farmers'
claim against the United States. The same arguments also support the contention
that a NAFTA Chapter 11 panel may lack proper jurisdiction to hear the Texan
farmers' Rio Grande claim against Mexico. In particular, since the Texans lack
standing to directly enforce or seek damages under the terms of the 1944 Rivers
Treaty before the IBWC, should NAFTA Chapter 11 be interpreted to provide
223. Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2.
224. USIWUC Press Release, supra note 107.
225. U.S. Attorney Brief supra note 79.
226. Id. at 13.
227. Id. at 18.
228. Id. at 20.
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the Texans with a backdoor route to seek such enforcement and damages?
2. Questions of Deference
Apart from the more legalistic question of whether a Chapter I 1 arbitration
panel has proper jurisdiction to hear the Texans' Rio Grande claim, there are
other reasons why a Chapter 11 panel should properly exercise its discretion and
defer to the IBWC's findings and resolution in evaluating the underlying merits
of the Texans' NAFTA water claim. As discussed above, the Texans' NAFTA
water claim against Mexico is merely the latest chapter in the long history of
implementation of the 1944 Rivers Treaty. The IBWC is in a much better
position than a NAFTA arbitration panel to take proper account of this history
when considering the question of Mexico's compliance with the Treaty's
obligations.
For instance, for many decades the United States met its Colorado River
quantitative delivery obligations (under the 1944 River Treaty) to Mexico by
providing water with saline levels so high that it was unsuitable for drinking or
irrigation. The IBWC was actively involved in monitoring and seeking a
resolution to this problem. To this day, the United States has not financially
compensated Mexico for the damages to Mexican farmers and cities resulting
from its contamination of the Colorado River.
As another example, IBWC records establish that prior to 1992, Mexico
delivered quantities of Rio Grande water to the United States that were in excess
of Mexico's obligations (and the United States' rights) under the 1944 Rivers
Treaty. Although this amounted to a windfall for the Texans that received and
used this excess water, Mexico did not receive any credit for such excess
deliveries under the 1944 River Treaty's water accounting regime.
As the institutional memory of joint implementation of the 1944 Rivers
Treaty, the IBWC is uniquely positioned to determine how the United States'
more recent claims regarding Mexico's Rio Grande delivery obligations fit into
such historical events as the Colorado River salinity crisis and Mexico's excess
Rio Grande deliveries during the 1953 to 1992 period.
Moreover, the role of the United States Department of State and Mexico's
Ministry of Foreign Relations within the IBWC is also relevant. It ensures that,
by seeking the resolution of disputes under the 1944 Rivers Treaty, the IBWC
takes account not only of water resource issues but also other foreign policy
matters. For instance, in recent years there have been extensive diplomatic
efforts between Mexico and the United States to address the economic
conditions in Mexico that underlie the problem of illegal Mexican immigration
into the United States. A sudden and severe reduction in Rio Grande water
deliveries to border farms and cities in northern Mexico could create
unemployment, health problems and disruption that contribute to existing
immigration pressures. Within the IBWC context, these considerations can be
accounted for in the positions staked out by the United States Department of
State and Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Relations. In contrast, these
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considerations would likely fall outside the narrow investment scope of inquiry
of the Chapter 11 panel.
The DOJ forcefully pressed this point in its briefing of Consejo. The United
States argued that permitting Rio Grande allocation and delivery disputes to be
resolved by private parties outside the IBWC, rather than through a state-to-state
diplomatic process, "would inherently encroach upon the Executive Branch's
prerogative of conducting the foreign affairs of the United States..."229 and
"would undermine the ability of the [United States] Section of the IBWC to
effectively carry out the foreign policy of the United States government." 2 30
The same objection could rightfully be raised by Mexico in response to the
Texans' NAFTA water claim.
As such, even if a NAFTA Chapter 11 panel has jurisdiction to hear the
Texans' Rio Grande claim, there remains the issue of whether it sets a wise
policy course when a NAFTA Chapter 11 panel second-guesses the IBWC-
brokered March 2005 diplomatic resolution reached by Mexico and United
States. This course would take the Chapter 11 process beyond the narrow sphere
of investment and into the complex sphere of foreign affairs - where it was not
designed and is ill-suited to go.
V.
CONCLUSION: A STRAINED CLAIM THAT MERITS REJECTION
In March 2003, McGill University Faculty of Law in Montreal, Quebec
hosted a two-day conference entitled GREENING THE FTAA?: TOWARDS THE
PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY IN OUR HEMISPHERE. The event,
organized by Environmental Law McGill, brought together leading international
scholars to evaluate efforts to integrate environmental protection and natural
resource conservation concerns into the ongoing negotiations for a treaty to
establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"). One of the central topics
covered was whether NAFTA's investor-to-state claims procedure should be
carried forward in the FTAA. In his closing remarks, conference director
William Amos observed:
[T]he FTAA is clearly a trade and investment agenda. In large measure, this
amounts to a property rights protection agenda. The logic of NAFTA Chapter 11
is the apotheosis of a broader plan to entrench property rights protections as the
foundation for an economic union of the Americas. The FTAA is manifestly not
being driven by an environmental agenda, or even a sustainable development
agenda. So, as our governments move towards a significant shift in the
hemisphere's political and economic landscape, I think civil society needs to take
229. U.S. Attorney Brief supra note 79, at 17. This same brief argues that "[t]he dispute
resolution procedure mandated in the 1944 Treaty does not involve the courts. The Treaty contains
no provision allowing judicial review of the determinations of the IBWC concerning the
implementation of Treaty-based rights. Indeed, the text of the 1944 Treaty demonstrates that neither
the United States nor Mexico had any intent that domestic courts would resolve conflicts concerning
the apportionment of the transboundary rivers governed by the Treaty." Id. at 18.
230. Id.at2l.
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a long hard look at the bases upon which we seek to build this community.231
Amos' comments highlight that the debate over Chapter I l's investor-to-
state process has implications well beyond NAFTA. Concerns about Chapter 11
raise more fundamental questions about the emerging relationship and tensions
under international law between protection for private investments and
protection for trans-border natural resources, and between international
trade/investment treaties and international environmental treaties. Concerns
about Chapter 11 also force consideration of whether the existing forums to
resolve conflicts between private investments and common natural resources are
adequate, and whether there are more appropriate forums that should be used or
created if they do not yet exist.
2 32
The Texans' NAFTA water claim against Mexico sheds light on these
broader themes, by providing a less theoretical context in which to consider the
investor protection regime established pursuant to Chapter 11. In the context of
the pending Rio Grande dispute, one sees how a broad interpretation of private
investor rights under Chapter 11 would undermine the efforts of the IBWC and
the governments of Mexico and the United States to equitably interpret the
provisions of the 1944 Rivers Treaty. One sees how the Chapter 11 process is
now being used to advance an expansive concept of fixed entitlements to water
that has been rejected here in the United States and is at odds with the 1944
Rivers Treaty's more flexible regime. One sees how poorly situated and
unqualified NAFTA arbitration panels are to engage in the resolution of
complex questions of foreign affairs involving compliance with international
environmental treaties and the management of border natural resources such as
water. One sees how parties whose interests are at stake in the Rio Grande
NAFTA claim - such as cities and farmers in Northern Mexico and water
conservation groups - are outsiders in the Chapter 11 proceedings without rights
of intervention or guarantees of participation.
In sum, there are numerous sound legal and policy reasons to reject the
Texans' claim against Mexico for the alleged non-delivery of Rio Grande water.
Moreover, a close examination of the Texans' Rio Grande claim demonstrates
that NAFTA Chapter 11 is itself flawed from a textual standpoint. The fact that
the current provisions of Chapter 11 should be amenable to an interpretation that
results in the rejection of the Texans' claim does not indicate that such
provisions are adequate. To the contrary, Chapter lI's vague and overly broad
definitions of investment and appropriation, non-recognition of other
international forums and sources of international law, and absence of
23 1. Conference Proceedings to Greening the FTAA?: Towards the Protection of Ecological
Integrity in Our Hemisphere, Conference at McGill University 75 (March 17-18, 2003),
http://www.law.mcgill.ca/elmftaaconference/eng/documents/proceedings.pdf.
232. Echeverria, supra note 11l, at 39 ("A radically different approach would be to embrace
the need for, and perhaps the inevitability of, a comprehensive system of international dispute
resolution, to address not only investment issues but a whole host of other issues as well. But to be
consistent with democratic ideals, this approach would require rethinking the entire international
law-making process.").
[Vol. 25:2
2007] TEXANS'NAFTA WATER CLAIMAGAINST MEXICO 267
meaningful public participation and appeal procedures, invite strained
compensation claims such as those put forth by the Texans. Given the
uncertainty inherent in Chapter 11 investor-state litigation, even when faced
with strained compensation claims, nations may choose to settle, either by
paying damages or refraining from the government action that gave rise to such
claims, rather than risking a significant damages award. To avoid this
possibility, NAFTA Chapter 11 should not serve as a template for future
investment treaties.
